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FOOD SECURITY AND RURAL VULNERABILITY IN ETHIOPIA: A
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE
By
Alemayehu Lirenso1
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes current food security and rural vulnerability situation in present day
Ethiopia from a development perspective. In the sections that follow: (i) various issues
relating to food security and vulnerability are presented, (ii) current food aid management
policies and practices are reviewed and their implications for overall agricultural
development policy are evaluated, and (iii) alternative strategies for combating the risks
of future famines are suggested. The analysis is based partly on my own previous studies
and partly on review of other recent studies listed in the references.
Concern for food security is especially high in Ethiopia for eight basic reasons:
First, Ethiopia has experienced large-scale famines for half a century. The famines of
1972/73, 1984/85, 1987, and 1998-2000 are all recent memories of mass starvations that
affected the lives of hundreds of thousands of people and livestock population.
Second, Ethiopia has third largest population (estimated at 62.8 million in 1999) in
Africa, after Nigeria and Egypt. Given the current population growth rate of 2.4 percent
per annum, Ethiopia’s population will be 118 million by 2025. The will put Ethiopia in
the 12th ranking in the world. Feeding such a large population with domestic and/or
foreign food supply would be a burden especially during famines.
Third, food distribution to affected regions at times of emergencies is a formidable task
because Ethiopia is a large country with an underdeveloped road network. Only 20 per
cent of the country is reached by modern road transport.
Fourth, the vast majority of the market-dependent population and people vulnerable to
famine live far away from ports that Ethiopia has already lost sovereignty. Even donors
(Oxfam March 2000) have acknowledged that getting aid into landlocked Ethiopia could
be difficult because the two main supply ports, Assab and Massawa, are lost to Eritrea.
Fifth, agriculture accounts for more than half of GDP (52.3% in 1999) and about 85
percent of export earnings2. Over 85 percent of the population of the country is the
agricultural labor force. It is implicit that a dismal performance of the agricultural sector
will have a serious repercussion on the national economy.
Sixth, Ethiopia is a country where food production on the peasant farms is highly
vulnerable to climatic changes. Irrigation is negligible, contributing less than 3 percent to
food production.
1
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Seventh, previous studies showed that food insecurity in Ethiopia is one of the highest in
Africa (World Bank 1988; Hubbard et al 1992; Maxwell and Belshaw 1989; Debebe et
al. 1992). These studies estimated that 46-55 percent total population are food insecure.
Recent studies also indicated that more than 43 percent of farming households are food
insecure even in relatively good harvest year, and about 50 percent of these are netbuyers of food grains (Clay, et al. 1998).
At last, not least, assessment of current food security situation by the government and
donors showed that famine is still looming in Ethiopia as we start the 21th Century. In
2000, it was estimated that sustained drought left eight million people in food and water
shortage3, the worst affected area being the Somali (Ogaden) Region in the southeast
which is known for being remote, fragile and vulnerable region (WFP/UN April 2000,
USAID/FEWS June 2001, and DPPC).
From the foregoing circumstances, no doubt that food insecurity and rural vulnerability
have been and will be the most pressing issues in formulation of development policy in
Ethiopia.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF FOOD SECURITY
Assessment of the current food security situation gives has a mixed picture at national
and regional levels.
2.1 Positive Developments
On the positive, it appears that prospects for food security are bright. The first major
development is record harvests in 1995-96 and 2000-01 crop years. The Ministry of
Agriculture (MoA) reported that food national production has increased from 6.34
million MT to 10 million MT in 2000 due to favorable rains and the nationwide extension
program. Subsequently, it was publicized that Ethiopia has closed the national “food gap”
and transformed itself from deficiency to surplus.
It is not clearly stated in official reports whether “green revolution” is already in effect.
What is known is the nationwide extension program covers 3.7 million farmers and
involves 15,000 development agents (MoA 2001). As a result of bumper harvests, in
recent months producer prices for food grains has declined by a considerable margin
from the previous year levels4. Analysts speculate that the decline in producer prices may
benefit the consumers in the short-run but would create production disincentive in the
long run.
With a record harvest in the history of the country, in 1996 it was publicized that Ethiopia
exported 100,000 MT of maize to markets in neighboring Kenya. The official explanation
for the export was stabilization of plummeting grain prices.
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This estimate includes all internally displaced people due to drought and war as well 206,000 refugees
from Somalia and the Sudan.
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producer prices were depressed even farm below the cost of production (USAID/FEWS 2001).
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The second major development is the local grain purchase for food aid distribution that
started in 1996 as a result of agreements reached between the Government and the
European Union (EU). In 2001, the Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise (EGTE) and the EU
purchased over 100,000 MT of wheat and maize from local grain traders to stabilize
producer prices, fulfill domestic food aid requirements, and stock emergency reserves.
This measure eliminates the logistics problems of importing food and creates more
incentive to domestic food production.
The third positive development is the MoA 2001 statement indicating that agriculture has
been growing at the rate of 3.4 percent per annum over the past 10 years. This is a good
progress suggesting the current food growth is now higher than the current population
growth of 2.4 percent per annum5. If all these official figures were reliable, there is a
good reason to be optimistic with caution.
Added to the positive developments is that the government’s and donors response to
recent famines has been partial successful. The USAID/FEWS report (June 15,2001: 2)
indicated that the Government, WFP, NGOs and donors have taken steps to mitigate food
insecurity in South-eastern Ethiopia (viz. Fafen, Hartisheik, Kebribeyah, Denan, Gode,
Afder and Warder woredas).
2.1 Negative Developments
Despite the positive developments mentioned above, the risks of mass starvation still
persist. In early 2000, prolonged drought caused massive starvation in Ogaden that local
grain purchases and distribution national emergency grain reserves could not stop.
To mitigate the situation, in January 2000, the Ethiopian government appealed for urgent
international food aid of 639,246 MT at the time when international aid was overstretched due humanitarian crises in multiple countries. Ethiopia had to compete
especially with Kovoso (in former-Yugoslavia) for food aid and was lucky to get its
share. The World Food Program of United Nations (WFP/UN) alone had imported and
distributed 490, 000 MT of food aid worth of US$220 million among 5.7 million drought
affected people. To date, the lives of hundreds of thousands people living in various
regions has depended on international handout6. Besides, the Ethio-Eritrean border
conflict that lasted for two years has displaced more than 350,000 in northern Ethiopia,
increasing the severity of food shortage. The negative image of all these is that Ethiopia’s
dependence on food aid has continued. A simultaneous occurrence of food selfsufficiency and famine has confused many including donors. In fact, Ethiopia’s food
insecurity is deep-rooted that even a record harvest can’t improve it.
The most recent reports were pessimistic in their prognosis of food insecurity in Ogaden.
According to USAID FEWS (June 2001), in the short-run, food aid will reduce
vulnerability but will not mitigate food insecurity for many thousands of people who are
5
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chronically food insecure due to the loss of their asset and income base. The Ogaden
nomads have lost their livestock assets at least in three ways: Firs, they slaughtered the
animals for meat just before the animals died of starvation and heat stroke. This coping
strategy was said to be unusual for the nomadic culture that has depended on livestock
mainly for sale income and for milk, nor for slaughtering. Second, thousands of animals
perished due to lack of feed and water. Third, to make matters worse, importing countries
banned the traditional export of livestock from Ogaden to the Gulf States during the
famine in fear of cattle disease. This external factor has seriously affected a critical
source of income for the nomads.
There is no official death toll of humans from the 2000 famine. Recent estimates by
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Save the Children USA and UNICEF put the
death toll at about 19,900 in Gode and about 78,000 in four other hard-hit areas. Most
deaths were due to wasting and major communicable diseases and 77 percent of the
deaths occurred before the humanitarian aid began in April 2000.
Field reports by relief agencies also predicted that despite much Government and donor
attention, food security in Ogaden remains “fragile” 7 among certain populations because
recovery process has not begun. While humanitarian conditions showed an improvement
from the year 2000, food insecurity persists in many localized areas. UNICEF and NGO
nutritional surveys in April 2001 showed alarmingly high rates of malnutrition and child
mortality among internally displaced people. All these indicated that relief aid is
insufficient to rehabilitate communities severely debilitated by drought and mass
starvation. Livelihood recovery programs are needed to complement food aid and
enhance coping strategies.
In April 2001 the WFP/UN, the world’s largest food aid agency, reported launching an
emergency operation of $203 million to feed 2.5 million people in Ethiopia. However,
signs of donor fatigue, on the one hand, and increase in the number of food insecure
people than originally anticipated, on the hand, forced the DPPC to cut the food rations in
Ogaden by 17 percent. The reduction in July 2001 was from 15 kg per person per month
to 12.5 kg. Relief agencies feared that the reduction in food rations coupled with acute
shortage of vegetable oil and blended supplementary foods would further delay the
recovery process of famine victims.
In brief, the current situation is one of food abundance co-existing with widespread food
insecurity. In relative terms, one section of Ethiopia feasts from for bumper harvests
while another section fasts due to lack of food. This gives an impression that current food
insecurity in Ethiopia has much to do marketing, consumption and entitlement problems,
and not production. Is there a missing link between regional food surplus and regional
food deficiency in Ethiopia? Will Sen’s (1981) theory of entitlement8 be helpful to
explain why famine is back again in 2000-01?
7

Here, “fragile” implies that the people are unable to maintain household food security in the short and
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Sen's (1981) seminal work on poverty and entitlement is helpful to understand this link between food
insecurity and poverty.
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Lastly, the negative developments remind us to pose five basic inter-related development
questions. Why is famine back again? Why should the Government appeal for
international food aid in the aftermath of much publicized bumper harvests and maize
export? How can famines recur after record harvests in the country’s history? Why food
aid, used over the past years has not helped averting future famines? Is there something
wrong with the management of food aid distribution or with the government’s food aid
policy? What agricultural development strategies would be effective to combat drought
and famine effectively?
III. THE ISSUES
In the Ethiopian context, several research and policy issues dominate the academic and
policy debate on “food security”9 and “rural vulnerability”10. Perhaps, food security and
“rural vulnerability” have drawn the attention policy makers, donors, international
development agencies and scholars more than any other agenda.
Four major issues are relevant to the analysis of food security and rural vulnerability.
These include: (i) understanding the roots causes of chronic food insecurity, (ii)
iidentifying the ecological regions and social groups that are food insecure, (iii) targeting
food aid and using resources effectively to avert chronic food insecurity or to promote the
developmental impact of food aid, and (iv) defining the role of government in food
security and disaster prevention.
The first issue requires examining whether the conventional cause of famine or mass
poverty and structural constraints are more responsible for famine recurrence in Ethiopia.
The second issue involves justifying the selection process or prioritization of certain
geographical areas and certain social groups benefiting from investments and food aid
programs.
How should food aid be targeted when and where everyone is not needy? Ideally, food
aid targeting takes two forms - area-targeting and household-targeting. Again, household
targeting can be administered in three ways – self-targeting, administrative-targeting, or

9
“Food security” is defined as the ability for all people in society to be able to acquire food at all times to
lead normal, active, healthy lives. It involves production, marketing, entitlement and nutrition (Maxwell
and Frankenberger 1992:66-70, Jayne and Daniel 1995). In contrast, "food insecurity” implies the lack of
access to enough food. It can be identified as chronic, transitory or cyclical in terms of time. Chronic is a
long-term problem arising from poverty and structural constraints affecting resource base or means of
survival of people. Transitory is of short term in nature and caused by a short decline in purchasing power
due to inflation or a sharp rise in food prices. Cyclical is the one that recurs at a given time interval.
Ethiopia has experienced all the three forms.
10

Unlike food security, vulnerability does not have a precise meaning varying from one field of study to
another (Downing 1991, Longhurst 1994, Webb, et al. 1994). Here, rural vulnerability implies the risk of
exposure of a given population or region to food insecurity and the ability of the population to cope with
the consequences of that insecurity. It reflects lack of buffers against contingencies, disasters, physical
incapacity, unproductive expenditure, and exploitation (Chambers 1986: 103-104).

6
community-based targeting11. Selective investment in food security schemes sounds
economical where and when resources are scarce and can’t be scattered everywhere. By
doing this, places having less need or less returns to investment may be excluded. In the
Ethiopian context, the selection would mean investing in either highlands or lowlands,
investing in either high-potential areas or low-potential areas, and investing on either
farm households or pastoral nomads. These are hard choices that policy makers have to
make while trying to balance economics with politics.
The third issue requires using the best investment method (cash or non-cash aid) to
maximize the short-term and long-term benefits of public projects. This means choosing
either more cash-for-work or food-for-work project. It also means either giving free-food
or project-based food to beneficiaries. In either case, it is interesting to know whether
food aid contributes sustained development or puts the country into more and more food
dependency. The fourth and last issue addresses the role of government in drought and
famine mitigation. This should include evaluation of the current policies, practices and
any shortcomings.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all the five issues listed above in detail.
Nevertheless, attempts are made in following sections to address the major ones for
which primary and secondary data were available.
IV. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF FOOD INSECURITY
Are the 20th century famines similar to or different from the current one? One similarity
they have is that they are caused by the combined actions of humans and nature.
Previous studies on the 1972/73 and 1984/85 famines have revealed that both natural and
human disasters cause all the three forms of food insecurity (chronic, transitory, and
cyclical) but categorically put the human action being the major cause12. Sen (1981:96)
argues that in 1973 thousands of the Wollo people in North-eastern Ethiopia starved to
death without there being a substantial rise in food prices. This happened because their
income and thus their purchasing power over food collapsed. This implies that analysis of
poverty is key to the understanding of food insecurity. Mesfin (1984) demonstrated that
rural vulnerability famine is a function of social forces claiming peasant resources and
exposing them to famine and mass starvation in years of droughts. Similarly, Lappe and
Collins (1986:16) assert that human not natural forces leave people vulnerable to nature’s
vagaries. He further states that famines are not natural disasters but social disasters or
social effects, the results of human arrangements. Dessalegn’s (1991) research showed

11

Administrative targeting means intended beneficiaries are selected using indicators as asset or livestock
ownership, age and gender, nutritional status, access to resources such as land and family labor.
Community-based targeting means eligibility of households for free food aid or project food aid is
determined based on community members’ prior knowledge of each household’s food security situation
and coping ability. Self-targeting is when only those who like to work for below-market wage and inferior
goods avail themselves for project food-aid.
12
According to Lappe and Collins (1986:22), asserting that famines are causes of nature’s vagaries makes
us feel helpless but believing that famines result from human-made errors makes us hopeful, thereby
forcing us to search for solutions.
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that it is in the years of recovery that the seeds of famine are sown. Are these findings
helpful to explain the 21th century famines?
4.1 Impact of Drought
In developed societies, drought does not necessarily lead to famine because the institutions
and resources needed to combat the disaster are already in place. Besides, food production
in developed economies takes places in commercial farms using irrigation, not rains.
In developing countries like Ethiopia, the situation is the reverse. The risk of impending
famine due to drought is still great since the link between drought and famine has not been
broken. Drought has a major impact on food production on the peasant farms. The rain-fed
peasant farms experienced erratic and unreliable rainfall disrupting food production.
Drought-initiated production failures occurred in the 1984/85, 1987/88 and 1989/90. The
1984/85 was the most serious one. A production declined by 27 per cent from the level of
the previous year triggered mass starvation. Consequently, famine occurred in most of the
regions, affecting over eight million people and leaving about one million dead (RRC,
1985).
During 2000-01, the distribution of meher (main growing season) rains was favourable for
crop production in highland parts of Ethiopia; the belg (short growing season) rains being
normal in north central Ethiopia13. The exceptions were the lowlands of South Tigray and
North Wollo where crop production has been lost.
In contrast to the highlands, in the nomadic areas of Southeast, belg rainfall was erratic
and light, with some areas receiving insufficient quantities for renewal of pasture, browse
and surface water resources. Specific areas of concern due to poor rainfall distribution
include parts of Gode Zone, southern Liben and Afder Zones and eastern Warder Zone
(USAID/FEWS, June 2001). There, failure of biannual seasonal rains for the past four
years made life miserable. Drought turned the pastureland into a near desert, the
temperature soaring above 105˚ Fahrenheit. As a result, 50 percent of the sheep and cattle
and 20 percent of camels perished14 even long before international aid reached in March
2000. Either the early warming indicators were missing or relief response was sluggish to
avert the death toll.
Livestock mortality is not limited to arid regions. A considerable of death cattle in the
wetter Western lowlands is caused by African trypanosomiasis, a disease carried by
insect vector known as tsetse fly. It was reported that, during 1994-97, draft animals
purchased from the highlands for plowing season in the Bales Valley were immediately
sold back at loss due to tsetse fly infestation (Kadir and Custer 2000). There, peasant
13

Meher extends from June to September and accounts for 95 % of food production at national level, 5 %
being Belg production in spring. But Belg production is more important than meher in highlands of Bale,
Shewa, and Western Wello. The economic significance of Belg rains ranges from helping flowering of
coffee plants to mitigating food shortages, and stabilizing grain and livestock prices in local, regional, and
national markets until the Autumn Meher harvest. Belg rains are critical to the nomads for pasture and
drinking water in the extensive pastoral areas of Southeastern lowlands of Ogaden, Elkere and Borena
(Alemayehu 1991).
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cultivators living in one settlement area had to spend about Birr 85,000 (equivalent to
US$10,625) per year on tyrpanocidal drugs.
The above-mentioned cases are all indicative of the situation that the marginal lowlands
areas are more vulnerable to disasters compared with central highlands areas. This is
indicative that the lowlands (both wet and dry) are more vulnerable to environmental
hazards.
4.2 Impact of War and Ethnic conflicts
During 1980s, the concurrence of drought, war and the restrictive economic policy had
made the food supply situation much worse. In fact, one could hardly isolate the effects
of war from those of restrictive policy or drought, or vice versa.
Since early 1990, the Military Government policy that restricted inter-regional grain
flows was abolished but wars and famines have recurred. The two-year Ethiopia-Eritrea
border conflict had coincided with the Ogaden famine, putting in fear that the war could
hamper relief efforts in two ways: (i) by commandeering trucks needed to distribute food
aid for military use, and (ii) by diverting international aid from relief to war operations. It
is beyond the scope this analysis to prove either of the two has happened.
When viewed from outside, Ethiopia may look more stable and peaceful in 2000-01 than
in 1980s. True, the long-civil war in Eritrea ended in May 19991 and the two-year border
conflict with Eritrea that displaced more than 350,000 Ethiopians stopped as of June
2000. These are positive developments for improved food security in future. But the
border issue is not settled yet and one can’t guarantee or foretell that Ethiopia will not
have another conflict with its neighbors in the future.
However, the inside look does not show stability even in areas hard-hit by recent
droughts and famine. According to UNAID/FEWS (2001) report many NGOs are
reluctant to enter into longer-term recovery programs in Ogaden, where safety problem
reduces the viability of these efforts. There, clan politics and insecurity have constrained
the relief and development programs. Recently, staff from aid agencies (including
WFP/UN) has been killed near Gode, one of the areas in most urgent need of food aid.
Continuing problems of insurgency by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) has
jeopardized food distribution and recovery efforts in Ogaden.
It is predicted that the only way recovery programs will succeed in Ogaden is if clan
leadership allows them to succeed. Without local political support, donor recovery
programs will never go beyond the provision of relief and localized food insecurity and
malnutrition will persist. Thus, the previous studies’ arguments that famines are not
natural but social disasters seem very solid in the Ethiopian context.
In years of drought, shortage of pasture and water has created conflicts and tensions
among nomadic populations and sedentary farming households. Reports from relief
agencies in Ogaden also indicated that limited access to pasture has caused some conflict
and forced some pastoralists to move their herds to areas with better pasture conditions.
In the current year, similar conflicts among nomads of different clans were noticed
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between the Amharas & Afars, the Gedeos & Guji Oromos, and the Boranas & Gares
clans along the Ethio-Kenya border. These incidents have adverse political and economic
effects for the nation, by disrupting rural livelihood, increasing political tensions, and
affecting the livestock economy that the country depends for foreign earnings.
4.3 Impact of Ethnic-Based Regionalization
Since the Ethiopian People Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF) took power in
1991, Ethiopia has been divided into seven major administrative regions (killils) based on
ethnic distribution15.
While conflicts among nomadic population over use of grazing land, water and pasture
had occurred in past regimes, the introduction of ethnic-based regional administration has
raised ethnic tensions to a high level. In the past few years, inter-ethnic and inter-clan
relations have been strained in many pockets of the country, thereby increasing food
insecurity and vulnerability. The recent displacement of Amharas from Wollega
(Oromia) is a manifestation of such strained relations. Under the Killil system, members
of one ethnic group are not expected to settle or work in another ethnic group’s
jurisdiction. This policy is not stated in the Constitution but the regional and local
officials and politicians have pursued it for the past decade.
How does the Killil policy relate to food security and rural vulnerability? My personal
observations and recent baseline surveys from densely populated ensete growing
regions16 help explaining the link. There are glaring evidences that ethnic-based
regionalization is affecting livelihood and the traditional coping strategies of the rural
poor.
In the past, scarcity of farmland land and lack of employment opportunities had forced
young peasants from Kambata, Hadiya, and Wolaita regions of Southern Ethiopia to
engage in off-farm seasonal employments outside their regions. This strategy had helped
augmenting their meager farm incomes and coping with food shortages during planting
season. The migrants were hired as casual laborers in coffee-harvesting (Keffa), cottonharvesting (Tendaho), corn harvesting in commercial (state) farms in the Rift Valley, and
in agro-industries.
However, since Killils were introduced, inter-regional migration of labor had ceased and
off-farm earnings have been affected. As early as 1991, some unexpected incidents had
happened. Farm households who settled in Arsi for decades were displaced for being in
wrong killils and civil servants (school teachers, health assistants, etc.) who were
employed in other regions either lost their jobs or were sent back to their home regions.
As a result, the seasonal farm laborers could not go out of their home regions for job
search in fear of discrimination.
15

These are Afar, Amhara, Benshangul, Somali, Oromia, Southern Ethiopia, and Tigray. The Harari
regional state and Addis Ababa are regional states are confined to their urban perimeters.
16

Ensete resembles banana and providing flour rich in starch, known locally as kocho. Some sources suggest
that up to 20 per cent of the total population of Ethiopia depends on this crop as major staple
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Recent development in the ensete regions reveal that population pressure is increasing
day by day17, traditional coping strategies are vanishing, and poverty is pervasive,
pushing the people into “green famine.” Unless measures are not taken to reverse the
situation, ensete regions will the next to be hit by mass starvation. The gravity of the
problem is serious in woredas with concentration of landless peasants and unemployed
youth and in communities where either a food-for-work or cash-for work project is
missing. Further research is needed on green famines in ensete regions. But the foregoing
cases clear indications that the current Ethiopian government’s ethnic-based
regionalization policy has restricted free inter-regional mobilization of labor and
increased rural vulnerability to food insecurity, thereby affecting traditional coping
strategies of the rural poor.
4.4 Resources Constraints and Rural Poverty
According to The World Bank (April 2001), Ethiopia is classified among the poorest
nations, with a per capita income of US$100. This leaves an average Ethiopian (rural or
urban) with less than US$0.30 per day. Whilst urban poverty18 is no less serious than
rural poverty in Ethiopia, our focus here is on rural poverty.
Chambers (1983:103-104) provided four characteristics of the rural poor as: (i)
vulnerable and exposed to diseases due to malnutrition and physical weakness, (ii)
lacking assets as a buffer against natural and man-made disasters, (iii) isolated from the
mainstream of national economic, social and political life, and (iv) powerless against the
powerful political and economic forces that affect their lives. The current status of
Ethiopian peasants is not different from the above.
There are ample evidences showing a close link between the resource degradation,
poverty, and vulnerability to famine in rural Ethiopia. First and foremost, there are an
ecological dis-equilibrium between environment and agricultural production, in both
highlands and lowlands.
FAO’s (1986) Ethiopian Highland Reclamation Study indicated that highland Ethiopia
(above 1,500m) hosts about 88 percent of the total population (equivalent to 55.3 million
in 1999), and 60 percent of livestock population. As a result, the land is overworked and
degraded, farm productivity is very low on non-fertilized plots, and there is an acute
shortage of feed for the cattle population supporting the mixed farming19. The same
report estimated that 3.7 percent of the highlands had been seriously eroded that they
17

Population density at national level was estimated at 62.8 person per sq. km in 1999. In comparison, enset
growing areas have very high population densities. For example, baseline surveys in Kambata Zone revealed
densities ranged from 413 persons per sq. km in Kacha Bira woreda to 499.9 persons per sq. km in Kedia
Gamela woreda.
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In June 2001, an International Labor Organization (ILO) disclosed that 27 % of the active urban
population in Ethiopia is unemployed, most of them being between ages 15 and 24. The report attributed
joblessness to the sluggish performance of the Ethiopian Economy and a rapid population growth.
19
It is common to see that cattle (including oxen used for plowing) die of lack of feed, a situation that puts
peasants in a brink of destitution.
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could not support crop production, while 52 percent had suffered moderate or serious
erosion. The report recommended that nearly 75 percent of the highlands need soil
conservation measure to support sustained cultivation. Given the fact that total population
has increased, from 42 million in 1986 to 62.8 million in 1999, it is expected that land
degradation has increased significantly in that past 14 years. Daniel (1990) gave a clear
explanation of how poor peasants on Ethiopian highlands accelerate soil erosion and how
environmental degradation, in turn, makes people poorer.
Another form of ecological dis-equilibrium prevails in nomadic areas due to overgrazing, Traditionally, Ethiopian nomads keep a large herd of animals as a symbol of
social status, without paying much attention to biomass or the carrying capacity of the
land. This human action in turn puts too much stress on the environment, thereby
resulting in droughts and famines like the one the happened in Ogaden.
The second equally serious problem is land scarcity due to increasing population
pressure. Recently the average size of holding in the major producing regions has been
reduced to less than one ha. The degree of landlessness is increasing at an alarming rate
due to population pressure, and about 5.7 million rural families have less than one hectare
of land (World Bank 1992:72). As mentioned earlier, ensete growing areas have
agricultural densities as high as 499 persons per ha. The outcome is that hundreds of
thousands of farm households become landless. In many cases they arrange for informal
land rents, which are becoming common nowadays. Landless peasants, therefore, account
for a considerable number of rural food insecure populations (Getachew 1994).
Thirdly, security of land ownership is a key factor in stimulating food production. In the
Ethiopian context, land is a determinant of economic growth as well as equity. The latter
issue has received considerable attention of policy-makers since the March 1975 land
reform. However, the reform has done little to attain food security. The new Constitution
ratified in 1994 denies individual farmers' right to sell, lease and transfer their land to
others. Prior to ratification, the advocates supporting state ownership of land argued
vigorously that private ownership would result in distress sale of land by peasants
(Dessalegn 1994). Their concern emanates not from past experiences but an implicit goal
of tightening control over the peasantry and rural life. This shows that powerless peasants
can’t decide for themselves as the state continues to play a paternalistic role.
Fourthly, lack of animal power is a major resource constraint to grain production and
food security. Oxen used for plowing land show a highly skewed distribution among
farming households. In some regions up to half of the farm households have no oxen, less
than 20 percent have one ox, 25 percent have a pair of oxen, and the rest more than a pair.
Also, a distress sale of livestock assets for food purchase and payment of debts has
contributed to lack of animal power and, hence, rural poverty.
Destitute farmers cannot afford buying farm inputs (oxen, seed, fertilizer, tools, etc.). It
would a minimum of Birr 800.00 (about US$100) on average to purchase an ox from
local markets. If they invest less, output and income will be less, putting them back to a
vicious circle of poverty. The reality is that ox-less peasants (usually young farmers,
female-farm households, farmers without alternative sources of cash income, etc.)
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account for a significant proportion of the rural food insecure population (Alemayehu
1991; Getachew 1994; FAO/WFP 1994:3).
The foregoing arguments have revealed three important points: (i) famine will be severe
on resource-poor peasants than those having land, oxen and cash resources, (ii) famine
will recur and chronic food insecurity will persist as far as rural households remain poor,
and (iii) a profound knowledge of resource degradation as well as the hidden and
dynamic nature of rural poverty is key to understanding the causes of chronic food
insecurity in Ethiopia. It is also an important element in designing strategies that help
combating drought and famine in Ethiopia.
V. PROBLEMS OF IDENTIFYING THE FOOD INSECURE
A proper analysis of food security requires answers to three important questions: Who are
food insecure? Where does the food insecure live? And why is that people are food
insecure? The third issue has already been discussed in Section IV above.
Identification of the food insecure is not an easy task particularly in poor countries like
Ethiopia where the majority of population live below poverty line. Besides, making a
profile of vulnerable groups is complex since the analysis involves a wide range of
variables: physical variables like rainfall and soil quality affecting crop production;
economic variables like availability of land needed to produce food or level of income
affecting purchasing power; social variables like entitlement to exchange food or receive
it as gift; and other parameters like amount of calorie intake determining nutritional status
and health.
In addition to the complexities of identification and measurement, it is relevant to
understand at the food security status of people is dynamic, in temporal and spatial terms.
A food secure person today may not be a food secure person tomorrow (Phillips and
Taylor 1990:1304). This implies that the number of food insecure population changes
from time to time and from location to location. Similarly, national or regional food
security does not imply household food security. A particular community may considered
food secure in general at a given time. But, in a class society, all households within the
community may necessarily not be food secure. It is, therefore, essential to analyze food
security at different times and at a disaggregated level.
In the present day, bumper harvest can’t be real measures of food security until all people
have access to the minimum nutritionally recommended level of food intake. In this
respect, per capital food availability is helpful to distinguish the food insecure households
from those who are food secure (Table 1).
Table 1: Classification of Households by Food Availability
Category
State of Household Food Insecurity Food Availability (kcal per person per day)
1
High Food Security
2,800+
2
Moderate Food Security
1,680 – 2799
3
Moderate Food Deficiency
1,000- 1,679
4
Extreme Food Deficiency
< 1,000
Source: Based on Clay, et al. 1998:4.
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Assuming that households in Category 3 & 4 in Table 1 are food insecure, in the 1990s, it
was estimated that Ethiopia had more than 11.6 million food insecure people. Of these, 4.8
million were farmers, 2.9 urban residents, 2.1 million nomads, 0.7 million people displaced
by ethnic conflicts, 0.6 million refugees from Somalia and the Sudan, and 0.5 million
demobilised soldiers and their families. The food deficit farm households accounted for
more than half while nomads constituted about a quarter (Figure.1).
The food-deficit farm households are mostly found in Tigray, Wollo, Gonder, and North
Shewa where agricultural land is seriously affected by deforestation and soil erosion. In
addition, market-dependent grain-deficit farm households live in cash-crop growing
regions where cash income from coffee and chat is used for the purchase of food grains.
The nomadic population lives in the arid peripheral areas and in the Rift Valley.
Figure 1
Food Insecure Rural Population in Ethiopia by Category
(base on RRC 1992 & Clay, et al 1998 estimates)
Demobilized Soldiers

5.7%

Refugees 7%
Internally
Displaced by
Conflicts

8%

Farmers
55.2%
Nomads
24.1%

From Figure 1, it is evident that rural Ethiopia has a large number of food insecure people.
But the number of food insecure in urban areas is not negligible. Of the10.8 million urban
residents (17.2 % of total population in 1999), ILO estimation shows that 27 percent are
jobless and, therefore, food insecure. Thus, food security is a problem of both rural and
urban Ethiopia.
VI. POOR TARGETING OF FOOD AID
Ethiopia’s dependence on food aid started in 1959 when a total of 72,500 MT of grain
(wheat and sorghum) was donated by the US government, under PL-480. This was in
response to famine in Tigray, Eritrea, and Hararghe caused by drought and locust
infestation. During the1984/85 famine, food aid jumped to over one million tonnes per
year. Since then, Ethiopia has received a considerable amount of food aid every year, the
quantities increased in drought years.
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Since the 1984/85 famines, there are a considerable number of international and local
Non-governmental agencies (NGOs) involved in relief management, food-for-work and
cash-for work projects20. The Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC)
controls the activities of NGOs and provides a general policy guideline. Each year, local
authorities (the Kebelie officials), select the beneficiaries who participate in food aid
programs. Self-targeting has been rarely used despite the fact that it has no disincentive
effects on labor supply where it was used in combination with community-based
targeting (Maxwell, et al. 1994).
It is asserted that a more efficient way to use food aid is to maximize its developmental
impact, focusing the developmental programs on low-income groups and on particular
kinds of investments. In the 1980s, more than two-thirds of food aid had been used as
emergency relief aid, about one-quarter for development projects, and the rest for price
stabilization and national grain reserve (Alemayehu 1988:73). This suggests that the
allocation of food aid had largely dictated by emergency situations, leaving less for
development projects.
In contrast, the current Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Policy shows a departure
from the past. The food aid policy indicates that 80 percent of food aid will be used for
projects and 20 percent for free distribution to those who are unable to work. It states “no
able-bodied person should receive food aid without working on a community project in
return.” This suggests, on the part of policy makers, a desire to link food aid and
development through employment based safety net schemes.
But, in practice, recent food aid distribution and management have suffered from serious
targeting erorrs - errors of inclusion of unintended beneficiaries and errors of exclusion of
intended beneficiaries. A review of different studies has also revealed five types of biases
in the distribution of food aid. These included regional-bias, political-bias, gender-bias,
and age-bias (Sharp 1997, Clay, et al 1998).
First, households in Tigray region have received more food aid than households in
another region (predicted mean kcal of food aid was 829 kcal per person per year in
Tigray compared to 99 kcal in Amhara, 23 in Oromia, 30 kcal in Southern Ethiopia, and
35 in other killil). Tigray is historically a food deficit region but its share of per capita
food aid availability has been far greater than any region. Field surveys showed that the
regional concentration of food aid showed low correlation with regional concentration of
food insecure people, thereby decreasing targeting efficiency (Clay, et al. 1998:4). In
mid-1994, a study of grain market structure and performance by KUAWAB revealed that
aid wheat that was distributed in Tigray was being sold at the Addis Ababa central
market (USAID/Ethiopia 1994). This happened because the food aid beneficiaries in
Tigray sold excess wheat in local markets to traders who, later, brought it to the central
market where demand for grains was relatively higher.
Second, while new spots of food insecurity have emerged in the 1990s due to drought,
layoff of civil servants, demobilization of soldiers, ethnic conflicts, etc., food aid has
20

The projects mainly include road construction, reforestation and soil conservation using stone and soil
bunds.
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continued to flow to the same areas that have been receiving aid for decades. This
suggests that attempts were not made to make area-targeting of food aid more flexible.
Third, despite RRC’s guidelines of prioritizing food aid to the needy ones, local
authorities have deliberately manipulated the selection of beneficiaries of food aid. This
was common especially during national or local election campaigns (Hill 1994, Sharp
1997). Food insecure people who were eligible for food aid but who didn’t elect the
ruling party members were denied food aid rations. Using food aid for political gains is a
further reflection of the paternalistic role of state and the rural elites interest to control the
powerless peasants.
Fourth, free distribution of food has favored women over men. This type of overtargeting women can be attested by a disproportionate number of females receiving free
food aid. The gender-bias resulted from the assumption that female-headed households
are more vulnerable than men-headed household. Similarly, elderly people (60 years and
above) received more aid than the working age people.
A recent evaluation of relief food aid in Ogaden also replicates the occurrence of
targeting errors. Despite, varying social status among nomads, neither community-based
targeting nor household targeting were used during 2000-01. There, food aid was shared
across the breadth of the population rather than targeting the poorest and most food
insecure households. Again, the practice has diluted the effectiveness of aid.
In all cases, poor targeting of food aid has reduced its development impact. According to
one evaluation, only 22.3 per cent of households with “extreme” food deficiency have
benefited free food aid or from project food aid. The bulk of deficit households (77.7%)
have no food aid safety net (Clay, et al. 1998:2-3). This is imperative that food aid
distribution and management has neither achieved efficiency nor equity. Thanks to
donors, food aid in Ethiopia has saved many lives in times of emergency, with little or no
developmental impact. There is still a missing link been relief food aid and development.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The analysis of the current food security situation and evaluations of the food aid
management practices discussed in the previous sections have several policy
implications.
First and foremost, it is important to understand the state should play a significant role in
mitigating famine. The responsibility of freeing starving people from hunger lies with the
state and not with the private sector. The private sector can contribute to food security
through food production, marketing and storage if well developed (Christensten 1991).
But maintaining emergency national grain reserves, providing famine early warnings,
stabilizing prices when vulnerable groups are unable to acquire enough food, developing
infrastructure such as roads needed to distribute relief food aid in remote areas,
maintaining security in areas where relief, recovery and development activities take place
are all responsibilities of the state.
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Secondly, it is essential note that the Ethiopian Government and donors’ interventions in
disaster prevention and famine mitigation have been remarkable. Policy measures that: (i)
increase domestic food production through nationwide extension program, (ii) use local
grain purchases for relief distribution and for maintain emergency grain reserves, and (iii)
conserve soils to protect land degradation are commendable. These measures should be
pursued vigorously and in a cost-effective way.
Thirdly, it is absolutely essential to protect national gains obtained from economic
reforms and better agricultural performance. These gains are fragile that a one-year
drought could easily remove the economic benefits unless protected. Besides, it is
absolutely essential to build the domestic capacity for emergency response and gradually
because toot much reliance on international aid is risky for a landlocked country like
Ethiopia.
Fourthly, drought and famine mitigation measures taken so far are not sufficient to avert
future famines. More should be done to break the link between drought and famine and to
end dependence of food aid as soon as possible. It is imperative that conquering drought
and famine in Ethiopia takes time and requires a commitment from donors, government
and the local people. Conquering famine may take longer as far as agricultural production
depends on rain. To combat drought, well-studied and carefully planned projects such as
dams, irrigation schemes, reforestation, pasture development, and land conservation
measures are needed. These should be initiated wherever conditions permit their
development in a cost-effective manner. Such investments will be costly for a poor
country like Ethiopia but will have a high payoff in the future by transforming the present
low potential areas into high potential areas (Maxwell and Alemayehu 1994). Project
food-aid can be one source of funding. Again, donors and NGOs who like to see Ethiopia
stand on its two feet can be invited to fund the projects. The recent debt cancellation by
developed and developing nations (U.K, Russia, China, etc.) also gives an opportunity to
use a portion of the national budget to fund these projects. To make this effective, the
DPPC, donors, and NGOs should work closely and the local people must be allowed to
participate in the design and implementation of the projects.
Fifthly, developing pasture and water conservation schemes in the lowlands may have
multiple benefits. It will ease the current conflicts over the use of water and pasture land.
A simultaneous development of feed in the highlands will help reducing draft-oxen
mortality due to lack of feed and contribute to food security in the mixed farming system.
Providing draft-oxen loan to poor peasants will not help reducing food insecurity unless
the shortage of feed is tackled first.
Sixthly, it would be over-ambitious and unrealistic to think that chronic food insecurity at
nation or regional level can be eliminated by a two-year bumper harvests. Surplus food
production helps narrowing or closing the food gap. But, it can’t be a real measure of
attaining food security without improved purchasing power of the food insecure and the
resilience of local food markets in remote areas. Tackling chronic food security and
vulnerability is a long process that requires alleviating poverty in both rural and urban
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areas (World bank 1986). Without poverty alleviation famines may recur at any time.
Creating off-farm employment opportunities and developing labor-intensive public
projects may help reducing food insecurity for the landless, resources-poor, and jobless.
Seventhly, government policies that directly or indirectly make people and regions
vulnerable to poverty and famine should be re-considered without much delay. These
include the land policy that denies ownership rights to farm households, and the ethnicbased regionalization that strains ethnic relations and restricts a free inter-regional
mobilization of capital and labor. Another serious policy flaw is the neglect of low
potential pastoral areas and ensete growing regions in 1996 Food Security Strategy
without adequate regional analysis of food insecurity and vulnerability mapping. It is
wrong to think that food insecurity is a problem of mainly cereal producers and
consumers.
At last, there are a number of shortcomings in the current food security policy and in food
aid management practices that need improvements or changes. These include:
(i)
Developing vulnerability mapping for all agro-ecological zones,
(ii)
Maintaining an accurate and up to date statistics on the number of needy
people by geographical areas,
(iii) Developing institutional capacity for better forecasting of drought and famine,
(iv)
Avoiding biases and misuse of food aid by local officials and elites for private
or political gains,
(v)
Closely monitoring food aid targeting at local levels, by allowing the
participation of local people to select the needy one eligible for food aid
programs,
(vi)
Promoting traditional coping strategies that contribute to poverty alleviation
and famine mitigation,
(vii) Designing and implementing policies that are non-discriminatory in regional
or ethnic terms,
(viii) Ending the paternalistic role of the state over peasants, and
(ix)
Promoting an on-going research on the dynamics of rural poverty and on the
disincentive effects of food aid.
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